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Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration II

15. Mandatory Mediation and Its Variations
by Nancy A. Welsh*
The use of arbitration to resolve international investment disputes clearly represents an
improvement over “gunboat diplomacy” and its implicit threat of violent confrontation.
Nonetheless, investors, States and other stakeholders have begun to express dissatisfaction with
some elements of arbitration in the international investment treaty context. First, arbitration
proceedings can be quite lengthy, and their transaction costs seem to be increasing. Second,
parties’ compliance is not guaranteed. Some States suggest they may refuse to abide by arbitral
awards. Third, the process focuses parties on their legal rights when non-legal issues may be
equally important and useful to achieve resolution. Fourth, arbitration can sometimes marginalize
parties’ unique socio-cultural characteristics and inhibit parties from identifying and building
upon their mutual interests. Last, losing parties (and even some of those who have won) are
unlikely to perceive arbitration as providing them with a meaningful opportunity to exercise selfdetermination in the resolution of their disputes.
As a result of these concerns, some stakeholders—investors, States and interested
international bodies—have begun to express interest in the consensual process of mediation. The
term, “mediation,” however, is used quite loosely at this point, and there is no single definition or
model of the process. Rather, there are several variations, and each is likely to serve certain
objectives better than others. Each is also likely to be more appropriate at certain points in the life
of a dispute. This essay will describe these variations and their suitability in different contexts. It
will also examine the advantages and disadvantages of making participation—or at least
consideration of the mediation process—mandatory. IIAs could, for example, require the use of
mediation whenever a dispute arises between parties. Such agreements could even condition
parties’ submission to arbitration upon documented proof of a previous attempt to reach
agreement through mediation. There are significant concerns about mandatory mediation,
however. This essay will examine those concerns and describe important and potentially useful
variations that permit parties to tailor the scope of what will come within a mandatory mediation
requirement.
This essay’s intent is simultaneously modest and ambitious: (1) to provide stakeholders
with important information regarding the key variations of mediation that are available in the
United States; (2) to provide stakeholders with important information regarding their options in
defining the scope of a mandatory requirement; (3) to enable stakeholders to avoid a premature
focus upon only the most obvious and controversial of those variations; and (4) to provide
stakeholders with some examples of creative adaptation that may inspire further creativity and
thoughtful adaptation to the international investment context.
Variations of mediation
What exactly is the process called “mediation?” Based on the definitions contained in
various influential documents such as the Uniform Mediation Act and Model Standards of
Conduct for Mediators, we can say with some certainty that mediation in the United States will
possess the following characteristics: the presence of a third party (called the mediator);
communication and negotiation between the parties; and voluntary decision-making or agreement
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by the parties. Mediators’ ability to meet separately with the parties—i.e., “caucusing” or
engaging in ex parte communications or “shuttle diplomacy”—also tends to distinguish
mediation from judicial or arbitral settlement conferences.
Beyond this, however, mediation in the United States takes many different forms. There
are several models that share a focus on drawing out the disputing parties, understanding their
values and underlying interests, helping them to communicate fully, respectfully and
productively with each other, and fostering their ability to develop their own, customized
solutions (Riskin and Welsh, 2008; Welsh, 2001a). These models are called “facilitative”,
“elicitive”, “understanding-focused”, “therapeutic”, or “transformative”. On the other hand,
mediation can be implemented in a manner that is “evaluative”, “directive”, and focused on
“bargaining”. This second set of models presents a rather different picture, in which the mediator
plays the central role, hopefully beginning by listening to the disputing parties but quickly
shifting the focus to the provision of advice to the parties and their lawyers, to help them to be
realistic regarding their options (usually in civil litigation or administrative adjudication) and to
guide them toward a resolution generally consistent with those options.
The available research generally suggests that the most effective mediations (and
mediators) are likely to combine elements of all of these models: thoroughly preparing
themselves and facilitating the preparation of the disputants and their lawyers; probing for
important interests; listening carefully and effectively; asking parties to explore or justify their
assumptions and predictions regarding legal outcomes; challenging unrealistic assumptions; and
assisting disputants and lawyers to develop responsive, realistic solutions (Riskin and Welsh,
2008; Welsh, 2004a; American Bar Association, 2008).
A wealth of research and theory affirms the importance of providing a mediation process
that the parties will perceive as fair (Welsh, 2007; Welsh, 2001b; Lind and Tyler, 1982) – also
described as one that offers the parties “an experience of justice” (Welsh, 2001b: 791-792). To
achieve this experience, the parties need: the opportunity to be fully heard; to know that what
they have said has been considered (ideally, by both the mediator and the other party); and to feel
treated in an even-handed and respectful manner (again, ideally, by both the mediator and the
other party). All of these procedural characteristics are consistent with the idea of drawing out the
parties and affirming their centrality to the dispute and its resolution. Importantly, they are not
inconsistent with a process that also involves the mediator ultimately playing a central role in
educating and guiding the parties toward resolution.
The goals of those using—or requiring the use of—the mediation process will guide the
decision about the most appropriate mediation model. If the aim of mediation in the investment
context is to enhance the parties’ ability to communicate and negotiate directly with each other—
which may be particularly important when there will be an ongoing relationship, a need to
collaborate in the implementation of any agreement, or volatile emotions or political situations
that must somehow be acknowledged to permit people to move toward an embrace of good
(though not their preferred) solutions—it appears important for the process to foster parties’
ability to engage in “mutual consideration” (Welsh, 2004a). In other words, the parties need
sufficient opportunity to speak and be heard, but they also need the opportunity to listen to each
other, to reflect upon what was said and to demonstrate that they have listened to each other.
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Certain courts and agencies have affirmatively selected this model and have implemented
monitoring and evaluation systems to ensure its use.
For a variety of reasons, however, the achievement of mutual consideration can be a
significant challenge, and parties are not always motivated to act in a manner that will be most
beneficial to their relationship. Meanwhile, continued conflict may not be acceptable. Resolution
may not just be desirable, but necessary. In response to these sorts of needs, many courtconnected and agency-connected mediators begin with facilitative interventions and then play an
increasingly central and even directive role to encourage the parties to settle. Of course, these
mediators should never become coercive or engage in “muscle mediation”. Such an approach is
wholly inconsistent with respecting the parties’ ability to engage in voluntary decision-making
and resolution. Research also suggests that if mediators make specific recommendations for
settlement, non-settling parties are likely to express dissatisfaction with the process. The line
between directive and coercive mediation, however, can be difficult to draw. In response, a few
courts provide that settlements developed in mediation will be binding only after a cooling-off
period has elapsed (Welsh, 2001a).
Variations regarding the scope of mandatory requirements
Many courts in the United States have also adopted mandatory mediation programmes. In
general, such adoptions occurred after courts realized that purely voluntary programmes were
receiving little usage. Federal agencies have also adopted variations of mandatory mediation. In a
different context, commercial contracts may now include tiered dispute resolution clauses that
mandate the use of mediation prior to arbitration or litigation. But what precisely is mandatory in
these contexts?
Mandating mediation can mean very different things in different courts (McAdoo and
Welsh, 2004). Some courts order all cases into mediation. Others use a substantive screen for
their mandatory programmes, identifying only particular types of lawsuits—usually those that
seem most likely to include important non-legal issues—to go to mediation. In contrast, other
courts may require all civil lawsuits to go to mediation, but then will exempt particular types of
cases. All of these represent “categorical” referrals to mediation. Other courts provide their
judges or court administrators with the discretion to order mediation on an ad hoc basis. These
are described as “discretionary” referrals (Sander et al., 1996).
Courts in the United States also have experimented with the scope of the mandatory
obligation. In some courts, parties are required only to consider the use of mediation and submit a
document to the court that responds to the court’s questions regarding the appropriateness of the
process. Other courts require parties to attend a case conference at which mediation will be
discussed. Sometimes, these conferences transform into initial mediation sessions. Other courts
explicitly require the parties to attend an initial orientation or mediation session. After the parties
have completed this obligation and thus have had the opportunity to develop their perceptions of
the mediation process and the particular mediator’s capacities, they may determine whether they
wish to continue with the process. Last, of course, many courts in the United States require the
parties to participate in an entire mediation process. In general, though, courts do not specify how
long the mediation must last or how many sessions the parties must attend. The mediation,
therefore, will last only as long as the parties wish to continue. Some courts impose an obligation
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upon the parties to participate in good faith in mediation, but most courts have interpreted this to
require only attendance and submission of required pre-mediation documents. (In some other
countries that do not mandate the parties’ participation in mediation, courts may nonetheless
refuse to shift litigation-related costs if they judge that a party was unreasonable in its refusal to
mediate.)
Even when courts have adopted a straightforward mandatory mediation programme, the
parties often play a role in determining whether or not the mediation will take place. As
previously noted, some courts require only that the parties consider the use of mediation and
submit a document. An individual judge or court administrator may then review the submission
to determine whether this particular case should be ordered into mediation. The judge or court
administrator is likely to defer to the parties if all of them agree that mediation is not likely to be
useful. On the other hand, the court is much less likely to defer to one party’s reluctance if
another party expresses interest in mediation. Even if a court has ordered the parties’ participation
in mediation, the court also may permit the parties to “opt out”. Some courts grant such opt-outs
on a very liberal basis. Others require the party requesting the opt-out to make certain showings
to demonstrate why the mediation would duplicative of earlier efforts, unlikely to be productive
or might even cause harm.
As a last point, and particularly in situations characterized by power imbalance, some
agencies and corporations have provided that if the less powerful party to a dispute requests
mediation, the other party must participate. In other words, the mediation process is voluntary for
the less-powerful party, but mandatory for the more-powerful party. The United States Postal
Service (USPS), for example, offers a mediation programme to resolve workplace disputes. If an
employee requests mediation to address a dispute with her supervisor, the USPS requires the
supervisor to participate. Similarly, some school districts in the United States provide that if a
parent requests mediation to resolve a special education dispute, the school officials must
participate.
Some commentators have urged that courts and other institutions should never make
mediation mandatory because this represents a violation of the parties’ self-determination and
may have the effect of coercing settlements and reducing actual or perceived access to the courts.
Other commentators are less categorical, expressing support for a time-limited mandatory
mediation programme in order to force lawyers and other repeat players to learn how to
participate in the process (Sander et al., 1996; Welsh, 2004b). Research has demonstrated that
lawyers who have experienced mediation are likely to recommend its use on a voluntary basis.
After this period of “coerced education”, courts may then convert to voluntary programmes or
provide for easy opt-outs.
Potential application to investment treaty disputes
In this brief essay, it is possible only to begin to consider the model of mediation that
could be most appropriate for international investment treaty disputes, as well as the most
appropriate mechanisms for a mandatory structure. Much depends upon whether the dispute
arising under an IIA is more likely to resemble a private commercial dispute or a public policy
dispute. In the former type of dispute, the issues and parties are more likely to be relatively welldefined, with a relatively straightforward allocation of decision-making and implementation

112

Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration II

authority. In the latter type of dispute, however, it can be quite challenging to define the issues
and the parties whose participation is required for decision-making and compliance.
Particularly for those IIA disputes with dynamics that are similar to those of public policy
disputes, it is likely to be especially important to use a model of mediation that will enhance the
parties’ ability to communicate with each other (and important constituents) and represent an
“experience of justice” for all. If the investor and State come to a mutually-understood solution
that truly represents an exercise of their informed and inclusive self-determination, they are more
likely to support and implement that solution. At the same time, the challenges of this situation
suggest the value of having an experienced and legally and politically-savvy mediator who can, at
the appropriate points, assist the parties in being realistic regarding their options and their
consequences. In other words, the most appropriate model of mediation for IIA disputes is likely
to be a hybrid. Given the research that exists, however, an IIA might particularly preclude a
mediator from providing the parties with her own recommended resolution, unless such a
recommendation is requested in writing by all parties.
Meanwhile, in this context, preparation of the parties for the consensual process of
mediation—as distinct from the adjudicative process of arbitration—is absolutely essential. Such
preparation is more likely if the IIA requires it. This may be accomplished by requiring the
parties and their attorneys to make pre-mediation submissions to the mediator as a prerequisite to
mandatory mediation. These submissions could require responses regarding the party’s definition
of the issues in dispute, perceived obstacles to reaching resolution, procedural adaptations that
would be likely to improve the likelihood of reaching resolution, the responding party’s
underlying needs and concerns, identification of other parties whose participation would be
needed to ensure implementation of any agreement (or avoid the likelihood that someone will
serve as a spoiler), the presence of externally-imposed deadlines, etc. Mediators regularly gather
this sort of information when they serve a convening function in public policy disputes. Even
some court-connected programmes seek responses to similar questions in order to customize their
mediation sessions in complex matters (Riskin and Welsh, 2008). Requiring the parties to engage
in this sort of analysis will make it more likely that the parties are prepared, the mediation
process is structured appropriately, and the mediation ultimately will enable the parties to make
progress toward resolution. Meanwhile, in some instances, the obstacles identified by one or
more of the parties in the pre-mediation submissions may persuade the mediator that requiring
mediation would be fruitless. Perhaps the mediator could be permitted to find that the parties had
fulfilled the mandatory mediation requirement simply by making their pre-mediation
submissions. In other words, the IIA could establish the basis for a principled opt-out.
Conclusion
Mediation can take many forms. The only constants are the presence of a mediator;
communication and negotiation between the parties; and voluntary decision-making or agreement
by the parties. Similarly, the mechanisms to implement mandatory mediation can take many
forms. Some mandatory mediation programmes or clauses are broader and more automatic than
others. Though such variations can be confusing, their existence also offers tremendous
opportunities to the stakeholders in the investment treaty context to specify the mediation process
and programme structure that is most likely to offer a responsive, useful and clearly alternative
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complement to the arbitration process. This essay has proposed one, very preliminary approach to
the institutionalization of mandatory mediation. Hopefully, this suggestion will encourage others.
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